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Cost-Effective Reduction of NOX Emissions from Electricity Generation 
Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, Ranjit Bharvirkar, and Anthony Paul Paper 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the benefits and costs of policies to reduce nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions 
from electricity generation in the United States. Because emissions of NOX contribute to the high 
concentration of atmospheric ozone in the eastern states that is associated with health hazards, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has called on eastern states to formulate state implementation 
plans (SIPs) for reducing NOX emissions. Our analysis considers three NOX reduction scenarios: a 
summer seasonal cap in the eastern states covered by EPA’s NOX SIP Call, an annual cap in the same SIP 
Call region, and a national annual cap. All scenarios allow for emissions trading. Although EPA’s current 
policy is to implement a seasonal cap in the SIP Call region, this analysis indicates that an annual cap in 
the SIP Call region would yield about 400 million dollars more in net benefits (benefits less costs) than 
would a seasonal policy, based on particulate-related health effects only. An annual cap in the SIP Call 
region is also the policy that is most likely to achieve benefits in excess of costs. Consideration of 
omissions from this accounting, including the potential benefits from reductions in ozone concentrations, 
strengthens the finding that an annual program offers greater net benefits than a seasonal program.  
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Cost-Effective Reduction of NOX Emissions from Electricity Generation  
Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, Ranjit Bharvirkar, and Anthony Paul Paper 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. electric power sector is facing a major and potentially costly change in 
regulatory limits on its emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX). The current policy proposal of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is motivated primarily by concerns about high 
concentrations of harmful ground-level ozone in eastern U.S. cities, of which NOX emissions are 
precursors. The policy will require electricity generators throughout the East to reduce their 
summertime emissions of NOX in 2007 by 62% according to EPA estimates, and nearly 70% 
according to this analysis. The proposal also includes a regional NOX emissions cap and a 
trading program in the eastern U.S. during the five-month “summer ozone season.” However, the 
proposal largely ignores the potentially substantial benefits from reductions in atmospheric 
concentrations of particulate matter (PM) that would accompany reductions in NOX emissions, as 
well as reduced nitrogen deposition into certain ecosystems. Whereas benefits from reducing 
ozone occur almost exclusively in the summer, the other benefits would be realized throughout 
the year. When reduced particulate concentrations and other benefits of reductions in NOX 
emissions are taken into account, alternative policies may emerge as more cost-effective. 
This paper analyzes the benefits and costs of policies to reduce the NOX emissions from 
electricity generation in the United States and seeks to identify cost-effective approaches. The 
investigation makes use of the Haiku electricity market model, which estimates equilibria in the 
electricity market, including changes in the investment and retirement of specific technologies on 
a regional basis. The model calculates changes in emissions, which are entered into the Tracking 
and Analysis Framework (TAF) to estimate changes in atmospheric concentrations of 
particulates and their health effects, and to value those changes in monetary terms that can be 
compared with the cost of pollution control. Estimates of other benefits from reduction in NOX 
emissions are not modeled directly, but their relationship to particulate concentrations is 
discussed based on related literature. 
This analysis considers three NOX reduction scenarios that employ caps that vary by 
geographical and temporal coverage. All the caps are based on an average emission rate for NOX 
of about 0.15 pounds per million Btu (MMBtu) of heat input at fossil fuel–fired boilers. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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1.  SIP Seasonal: a five-month (summer) cap on NOX emissions in the eastern states 
covered by EPA’s so-called NOX SIP Call. These are the states required to submit 
state implementation plans, or SIPs, for reducing emissions, as discussed below. 
2.  SIP Annual: an annual cap on NOX emissions in those eastern states. 
3.  National Annual: a nationwide annual cap on NOX emissions. 
Our results show that the SIP Annual policy offers net benefits (benefits minus costs) that 
exceed those from the SIP Seasonal policy, the current policy initiative of the EPA, by about 400 
million dollars per year (1997 dollars). This measure includes particulate related health benefits 
only, but we reason confidently that the inclusion of other benefits would only strengthen this 
finding. The finding emerges because the particulate related health benefits of the SIP annual 
policy are more than double those of a SIP seasonal policy, yet costs are only slightly greater. On 
the basis of particulate related health benefits alone, we do not find benefits in excess of costs, 
though when benefits that we do not measure are included we expect the total benefits to exceed 
costs. Our main finding is that if a seasonal program is going to be implemented based on ozone 
related benefits (that we do not model) as is intended by current policy, then the additional 
benefits of extending the program to an annual basis far outweigh the additional costs.  
However, we do not find a justification for extending the program geographically to 
cover the entire nation, based on particulate related health benefits and compliance costs that we 
measure. The SIP Annual policy offers net benefits that exceed the National Annual scenario by 
over 900 million dollars per year.  
The effect on electricity price is politically important because of its visibility. Within the 
SIP Call region, the price under the SIP Annual policy is less than the price under  the SIP 
Seasonal policy even though emission reductions are greater. At a national level the order is 
reversed, and electricity price is slightly greater in the SIP Annual scenario than in the SIP 
Seasonal scenario.  
Extending the program from a seasonal to an annual basis must be accomplished without 
increasing summer season emissions if the ozone-related goals of the current SIP Seasonal 
program are not to be undermined. All of the scenarios we discuss achieve the summer season 
NOx emission targets of the SIP Seasonal program. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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Considered independently, the particulate-related health benefits that are achieved by a 
reduction in NOX emissions are less than the costs of compliance in the scenarios. However, the 
estimates of benefits from particulate reductions are not a full accounting of benefits. When the 
benefits that are not modeled are taken into account in our literature review in Section 6 - 
including benefits of ozone reduction and non-health benefits of particulate reduction - each of 
the three scenarios appears likely to have benefits roughly equal to or in excess of compliance 
costs. 
Further, the inclusion of benefits that are omitted from our analysis would strengthen our 
main finding that a SIP Annual program is the most cost-effective of the scenarios we examine. 
Under an annual program, some additional benefits in the non-summer months would be realized 
in the benefit areas that we do not model. Hence, consideration of the omitted benefits would 
further increase the estimate of total benefits that result from extending the program to an annual 
basis, while all of the costs have already been considered.  
The conclusion of this analysis is unusually clear for policy analysis. We suggest that the 
EPA and the affected states should consider replacing or supplementing the current initiative for 
the eastern United States—a seasonal program to reduce NOX emissions—with a new initiative 
aimed at annual reductions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we elaborate the motivation for and 
objectives of the research. In Section 3 we describe the scenarios modeled in this study and the 
underlying assumptions. In Section 4 we describe the Haiku and TAF models. In the Section 5 
we discuss the results, and in Section 6 we summarize and compare our findings with the 
previous literature. Section 7 provides our conclusion.  
2. Motivation 
The design of a program to reduce NOX emissions will have an effect on the choice of 
technologies for reducing emissions and therefore on the cost and cost-effectiveness of the 
reductions. The design of the program will also affect the nature and magnitude of the benefits. 
NOX is a precursor to secondary pollutants, including ozone and particulate matter. Ozone has a 
widely recognized effect on human morbidity and potentially on mortality, although the latter 
effect is not firmly established. The creation of ozone is largely seasonal, and EPA has designed 
its program to address this seasonality. However, NOX emissions throughout the year contribute 
to particulate matter concentrations. Particulate matter has been firmly associated with both 
morbidity and mortality, and many health scientists consider particulate matter concentrations to Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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be a bigger threat to human health than ozone concentrations, and health economists find that it 
imposes substantially greater costs on society. In addition, NOX emissions contribute to the 
ultimate deposition of nitrates and thus to environmental problems, including acidification of 
ecosystems. 
Both ozone and particulate matter pollution are widespread problems in the United 
States, and many metropolitan areas have not achieved compliance with National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS). The electricity sector is an important focus for two reasons. First, it 
contributes about 25% of NOX emissions in the United States. Second, these emissions are often 
emitted through tall stacks at high velocity, causing wide dispersion and contributing to regional 
pollution problems.  
Emissions of NOX from electricity generation had been loosely regulated until the last 
decade. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act implemented performance standards for new 
sources that varied by fuel type and were not constraining for most projects. In 1998 EPA 
revised the standards to be output based and fuel neutral, and expressed them in units of 
pollution per megawatt-hour (MWh) of generation. New sources built in areas that have attained 
the ambient ozone standard set by EPA have to prevent significant deterioration of air quality, 
and install the Best Available Control Technology (BACT), which translates into an emission 
rate standard of 0.15 pounds of NOX emissions per MMBtu of energy input. New sources in 
nonattainment areas have to install the more stringent Lowest Achievable Emissions Reduction  
(LAER) technology. Furthermore, in nonattainment areas, new sources must obtain offsets for 
their pollution through reducing pollution at existing sources. Existing sources were virtually 
exempt from NOX regulations until the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act mandated a 
significant reduction in NOX emissions at existing electricity-generating facilities through 
technology performance standards that created different emission rate standards for each coal-
fired boiler technology across the industry.  
Increasing attention has focused on the tendency of NOX to travel long distances and its 
contribution to regional pollution problems, especially nonattainment of the NAAQS for ozone. 
Because pollution drifts from other areas, many jurisdictions found that they would not be in 
compliance with the ozone NAAQS even if their own emissions were reduced to zero. The 
regional and transboundary nature of NOX-related pollution motivated the Ozone Transport 
Region (OTR), that comprises of eleven northeastern and mid-Atlantic states, to initiate a three-
phase reduction program. The first phase applied “reasonable abatement control technology” in 
1995 for year-round compliance, essentially requiring low-NOX boilers. The second and third 
phases established NOX emission “budgets” for each state for the five-month summer season Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
5 
(i.e., from May through September), when ozone is commonly a problem. Phase II enabled 
emissions trading among sources and states, beginning in summer 1999. The total NOX budget 
for the region is 219,000 tons per summer (U.S. EPA 1997), a substantial reduction from the 
490,000 tons of emissions in the region in the baseline year, 1990. In Phase III, which is 
expected to begin in May 2003, the summer allocation will be reduced further to 143,000 tons 
and trading will still be allowed. 
The OTR in the Northeast is a subset of the larger eastern U.S. region that is subject to 
substantial transboundary drift of NOX. Because the states were concerned that they could not 
achieve the one-hour ozone NAAQS by the November 1994 deadline, as mandated by the 1990 
amendments to the Clean Air Act, an Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG) was formed 
to study the issue and develop a plan. Its goal was to develop consensus among the states for a 
coordinated effort to reduce ground-level ozone in the eastern United States. After OTAG, 
working with EPA, released its final report in June 1997, eight northeastern states (joined by 
three other states in 1999) filed petitions under section 126 of the Clean Air Act requesting that 
EPA address emissions of NOX from sources in upwind states that were contributing to their own 
nonattainment of the ozone NAAQS. 
In response, the EPA proposed a model regional cap-and-trade program for NOX 
emissions that addresses the transport of ground-level ozone. On September 24, 1998, the EPA 
formalized this proposal in a rule widely referred to as the NOX SIP Call, which required 22 
states and the District of Columbia to submit by September 1999 revisions to their SIPs outlining 
their strategies for achieving NOX emissions reductions effective May 1, 2003. After various 
court proceedings, the date for submitting revised SIPs was delayed until October 2000, and the 
date for achieving the reductions was postponed until May 1, 2004. The courts also modified the 
SIP Call region so that, in the end, it will probably encompass 19 states and the District of 
Columbia. At the national level, EPA expects the program to lead to reductions of 22% from an 
annual baseline level of 5.4 million tons in 2007 to a new annual level of 4.25 million tons, 
according to EPA estimates. Summer-season emissions in 2007 would fall by 40% from 2.4 
million tons to 1.45 million tons (U.S. EPA, 1998a, and 1998b). In the SIP Call region, the 
program would lead to annual reductions of 34%, from projected baseline levels of 3.51 million 
tons to 2.33 million tons in 2007. In the five month summer season, the EPA expects the 
program to reduce emissions by 62%, from 1.5 million tons to 0.56 million tons.  
The regional NOX program comes at a time when calls for more drastic reductions of 
several pollutants are taking shape as part of a possible reauthorization of the Clean Air Act. 
Legislation proposed in the last congress would seek reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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(SO2), carbon dioxide (CO2), and mercury as well as NOX from the electricity sector. These bills 
would apply a variety of approaches, ranging from uniform technology standards to emissions 
trading. For example, one proposal (S.1949) would require NOX reductions greater than 90% of 
uncontrolled levels at each plant. Three other bills (S. 1369, H.R. 2645, and H.R. 2980) set 
specific national caps of 1.66 million to 1.83 million tons per year and would allow trading while 
two bills (S. 172 and H.R. 25) would set a national cap of about 3 million tons per year and 
would allow trading. Yet another bill (H.R. 2900) would set a national cap of 1.55 million tons 
per year and also require existing plants to meet new source performance standards at age 30.  
The electricity industry is already switching from coal or oil to natural gas as the 
preferred fuel for new generation facilities, and the proposals have implications for the rate at 
which that transition will continue. Emissions of all the mentioned pollutants are much greater 
from coal or oil than from gas; emissions of SO2 and mercury are virtually zero for gas. Taken in 
isolation or as part of a moderate multiple pollutant package, the proposed NOX emission 
reductions under the SIP Call are expected to prompt the installation of post-combustion controls 
at coal-fired plants and many gas-fired facilities as the primary means of compliance. However, 
they are not expected to accelerate significantly the transition to natural gas.  
The ever-changing nature of environmental regulation of the electricity sector raises 
questions about the design of a program to reduce NOX emissions, and its cost and 
environmental consequences. The objective for this research is to investigate the costs and 
benefits of alternative designs and to identify the most cost-effective option among those being 
discussed for implementation in the near term. To address this objective, we use the Haiku model 
to solve three scenarios for NOX reductions, and we link the results with the TAF integrated 
assessment model.  
3. Scenarios 
The calculation of NOX reductions relies on a definition of a baseline scenario with which 
other scenarios can be compared. Our baseline includes the NOX trading program in the 
northeastern Ozone Transport Region (Phase II) but excludes new policies to reduce NOX in the 
multi-state SIP Call region. We assume that there are no policies implemented to reduce CO2 
emissions, and there are no changes in the regulation of SO2 emissions beyond those established 
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. We assume no change in economic regulatory policy 
toward the electricity industry beyond that adopted by states in each of the North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) subregions as of 2000. The schedule for transition from Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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cost-of-service to marginal cost or market-based pricing by region is reported in Table 1, along 
with an indication of which states are covered by which regions.  
With the baseline scenario as a backdrop, we consider three policy scenarios for NOX 
reductions. No other assumptions in these scenarios differ from the baseline. All three scenarios 
include the flexibility to trade NOX emissions allowances among all NOX-emitting electricity 
generators within the regulated region.  
The first scenario is labeled SIP Seasonal, and it corresponds to EPA’s proposed 
program. This scenario includes a five-month summer ozone program implemented in the 
eastern states represented by six NERC subregions, namely NY, NE, MAAC, MAIN, ECAR, 
and STV, in the Haiku model that are roughly equal to the SIP region. The emissions cap under 
this policy is 444,300 tons per summer season within the SIP region, compared with an 
emissions level of 1.445 million tons in the baseline. This emission cap was determined by 
applying the emission rate of 0.15 lb per MMBtu to fossil-fired generation in the baseline for 
1997 in the Haiku model, which is similar to the methodology applied by EPA. Forecast 
electricity generation varies slightly in our model, and the geographic coverage varies slightly, 
from the EPA model (U.S. EPA 1998a, 1998b, 1999).  
The second scenario is SIP Annual. Here, the average emission rate achieved during the 
five-month summer season for the SIP region is extended to an annual basis. The annual 
emissions cap under this policy is 1.06 million tons per year within the SIP region, compared 
with an emissions level of 3.45 million tons in the baseline. 
The third scenario is National Annual. The SIP Call emission rates are used to calculate 
an annual emissions cap for the nation. The emissions cap under this policy is 1.66 million tons 
per year for the nation, which is derived by multiplying national fossil-fired electricity generation 
in the baseline by an emission rate of 0.15 lb/MMBtu of heat input.  
4. The Models 
The Haiku electricity market model was developed to contribute to integrated assessment 
with support from EPA, U.S. DOE, and RFF.  The model calculates equilibria in regional 
electricity markets with interregional electricity trade and includes fully integrated algorithms for 
investment and retirement of generation capacity, selection of NOX emissions control 
technology, and SO2 compliance. The model simulates electricity demand, electricity prices, the 
composition of electricity supply, and emissions of major pollutants, including NOX, SO2, 
mercury, and CO2. Generator dispatch in the model is based on minimization of short-run Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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variable costs of generation. Technical parameters in the model are set to reflect midpoint 
assumptions by EIA and other organizations regarding technological change, growth in 
transmission capacity, and a number of other factors. 
Two important components of the Haiku model are the Intraregional Electricity Market 
Component and the Interregional Power Trading Component. The Intraregional Electricity 
Market Component solves for a market equilibrium identified by the intersection of electricity 
demand for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and commercial) and supply curves for 
four time periods (peak, shoulder, middle, and baseload hours) in three seasons (summer, winter, 
and spring-fall) within the 13 NERC subregions. Each regional supply curve is parameterized 
using cost estimates and capacity information for up to 45 aggregate “model plants” defined by 
technology, fuel, and vintage. The Interregional Power Trading Component solves for the level 
of interregional power trading necessary to achieve equilibrium in regional electricity prices 
(gross of transmission costs and power losses). These interregional transactions are constrained 
by the assumed level of available interregional transmission capability as reported by NERC.  
The model can be used to simulate changes in electricity markets stemming from public 
policy associated with increased competition or environmental regulation. In this analysis we 
adopt a conservative assumption by assuming that regions that have not committed themselves to 
a schedule of transition to market-based prices continue with cost of service pricing indefinitely 
over the study period.  
Changes in emissions of relevant pollutants are fed into the Tracking and Analysis 
Framework (TAF). TAF is a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed model constructed with the 
Analytica modeling software (Bloyd et al. 1996; ORNL 1995). TAF integrates pollutant transport 
and deposition (including formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), visibility 
effects, effects on recreational lake fishing through changes in soil and aquatic chemistry, human 
health effects, and valuation of benefits.  
In this exercise, only changes in health status are evaluated. The population considered is 
the population of the contiguous 48 states. These values are calculated at the state level and 
aggregated to the NERC subregion level; changes outside the United States are not evaluated. 
Health effects are characterized as changes in health status predicted to result from changes in air 
pollution concentrations. Impacts are expressed as the number of days of acute morbidity effects 
of various types, the number of chronic disease cases, and the number of statistical lives lost to 
premature death. The health module is based on concentration-response (C-R) functions found in 
the peer-reviewed literature. The C-R functions are taken, for the most part, from articles Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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reviewed in EPA’s Criteria Documents (for example, EPA Section 812 prospective and 
retrospective studies). The health effects module contains C-R functions for particulate matter 
smaller than ten microns in diameter (PM10), total suspended particulates (TSP), sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), sulfates (SO4), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and nitrates (NO3). In this exercise, the potency of 
nitrates for mortality effects is treated as distinct from the potency of sulfates. Sulfates are 
considered relatively more potent than other constituents of PM10; and nitrates are treated as 
comparable to other components of PM10. The specific PM10 mortality C-R function used in this 
analysis is drawn from Schwartz and Dockery (1992). For morbidity PM10 is modeled according 
to a scheme designed to avoid double counting, such as symptom days and restricted activity 
days, using a variety of studies from the literature. NOX is included for respiratory symptom 
days, eye irritation days, and phlegm days. 
Inputs to the health effects module consist of changes in ambient concentrations of SO2 
and NOX, demographic information on the population of interest, and miscellaneous additional 
information, such as background PM10 levels for analysis of thresholds, though no thresholds are 
presumed to exist in this exercise. The change in the annual number of impacts of each health 
endpoint is the output that is valued. The health valuation submodule of TAF assigns monetary 
values taken from the environmental economics literature to the health effects estimates 
produced by the health effects module. The benefits are totaled to obtain annual health benefits 
for each year modeled. The numbers used to value these effects are similar to those used in 
recent regulatory impact analysis by EPA. However, the value of a statistical life (VSL), $3.815 
million (1997) dollars, is adjusted somewhat downward, compared with EPA numbers, because 
the value used by EPA is drawn primarily from studies of prime-age working males facing small 
risks of workplace mortality. In contrast, particulate pollution primarily affects seniors and 
people with impaired health status, and it is also thought to have more effect on young children 
than on the general population. Various authors have suggested that the value of health effects 
should be responsive to the nature of the injury and issues like age and health status; this 
controversy is discussed in EPA’s recent studies. (Krupnick, Alberini et al., 2000) 
5. Results 
This section presents the results obtained in Haiku and TAF, beginning with a discussion 
of the findings on emissions reductions and health benefits. This discussion is followed by a 
description of compliance strategies and the effect on electricity consumption and price. 
Subsequently, we discuss economic costs in comparison to benefits, and evaluate our findings in 
the context of previous research. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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The NOX caps that we examine are implemented by the year 2004. We analyze results for 
the year 2008 in comparing our three policy scenarios with the business-as-usual baseline. We 
choose 2008 for analysis because it is sufficiently in the future that full implementation of these 
policies and adjustments in electricity generation capacity could be achieved.  
5.1 Changes in Emissions and Health Benefits 
For each policy scenario the total NOX emissions within a regulated region and time 
period are given as an input to the model. The SIP Seasonal scenario limits NOX emissions 
during the five-month summer ozone season to 444,300 tons in the SIP Call region. In other 
seasons the NOX controls are not required to operate, which provides a financial savings by 
reducing variable costs of generation at these facilities. We find the annual NOX emissions in the 
SIP region in the SIP Seasonal scenario, reported in Table 2, fall by more than 1 million tons 
from the baseline, with nearly all the reductions occurring within the summer season. This 
estimate of the emission reduction of just over 70% in the summertime months is slightly greater 
than the EPA estimate of 62% (U.S. EPA, 1998b) due to differences in the models and to 
different estimates of emissions in the baseline. The reductions in NOX emissions in the SIP Call 
region are almost identical to those achieved nationally. The shaded cells in Table 2 indicate the 
regional and temporal target of each policy. 
Extending the NOX program to the entire year in the SIP Call region under the SIP 
Annual scenario leads to annual reductions in NOX emissions of almost 70% from the baseline in 
the SIP Call region. At the national level, NOX emissions fall by almost the same amount in 
absolute terms as within the region. In both the SIP Seasonal and SIP Annual scenarios, the 
reductions at the national level are slightly less than within the region, suggesting a slight 
leakage of emissions and generation to outside the region affected by the emission cap.  
The National Annual scenario yields slightly lower emissions of NOX within the SIP Call 
region than does the SIP Annual scenario because the marginal costs of emission reductions 
within the SIP region are lower than for the rest of the nation. (Compare the SIP Annual and 
National Annual marginal costs in Table 9 as discussed in Section 6.) Nonetheless, there are 
significant additional reductions outside the region. Total emissions nationwide fall by more than 
70% from the baseline.  
The SIP Annual and National Annual scenarios allow trading between summer and other 
seasons. However, Table 2 reports that summer emissions differ only slightly among the 
scenarios. The summer emission cap of 444,300 tons of NOX emissions that is calculated by Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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applying the regulatory emission rate to generation in the baseline is satisfied in all cases. The 
difference from the cap is partly attributable to the stopping rule for the iterative process in the 
model as calculations converge toward the solution. The SIP Annual scenario comes closest to 
achieving the cap exactly. Summer emissions in the SIP Seasonal scenario are 20,000 tons less; 
and, summer emissions in the SIP region under the National Annual scenario fall by another 
26,000 tons. Furthermore, the summer cap that applies under Phase 3 of the OTR, affecting a 
subset of northeastern states, is always satisfied. Under the National Annual scenario, emissions 
in the northeastern states are 58,000 tons below the OTR Phase 3 cap. 
The nationwide annual emission results for NOX are entered into the TAF model to 
estimate changes in pollutant concentrations as a consequence of atmospheric transport and, in 
turn, changes in health status. Table 3 reports the monetized values of these health impacts. 
Typically, the reductions in premature mortality are estimated to be about three and one half 
times those from changes in morbidity. Emissions changes from electricity generation from the 
SIP Seasonal policy are expected to yield total particulate-related health benefits of $749 million 
for the nation over the course of an entire year. The SIP Annual policy yields benefits of almost 
$1.8 billion. The National Annual policy yields benefits of about $2.56 billion. 
The benefit estimates assume that NOX emissions from other sectors of the economy are 
not affected by the new NOX policies imposed on the electricity sector. To the extent that a NOX 
policy raises the price of electricity, it could cause some substitution of other fuels, such as 
natural gas or fuel oil. The amount of additional NOX emissions created by such a shift depends 
on the change in the price of electricity, the cross price elasticities of demand for other fuels, and 
the NOX emission rates. Shifting from electricity to natural gas will create smaller NOX 
emissions “leakage” from the electricity sector and into another sector than shifting from 
electricity to fuel oil. Our models are unable to estimate the potential size of these shifts. 
However, the relatively small effect of the policies on the price of electricity suggests that such 
intersectoral emissions leakages are likely to be very small. 
5.2 Changes in Technology, Consumption, and Price 
To comply with the cap, emissions can be reduced in three ways. One is the installation 
of post-combustion controls. We model two types of post-combustion controls: selective 
catalytic reduction (SCR) and selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR). A distinguishing feature 
of these technologies is that SCR is likely to have greater capital costs, somewhat lower variable 
costs and somewhat higher NOX removal efficiency than SNCR. Hence, the decision about Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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which type of post-combustion control to install would be influenced by the expected utilization 
of a facility. Other things equal, a baseload electric generating unit that is utilized many hours of 
the year would be relatively more likely to install SCR, and a unit that is utilized fewer hours of 
the year would be relatively more likely to install SNCR (Napolitano, 1999). The post-
combustion controls that are installed are reported in Table 4. This table includes only retrofit 
controls; it does not include controls installed to comply with new source performance standards. 
In our model results, all of the installed retrofit controls are at coal-fired power plants. Table 5 
reports the annual variable cost, which includes the variable and fixed portions of operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of NOX control and the annual capital expense for each type of control. The 
total annual expense is the sum of annual variable and annual capital costs for SCR and SNCR 
combined. In the SIP Seasonal scenario, the additional total annual costs beyond those incurred 
in the baseline total almost $2.15 billion. Reductions at facilities that install post-combustion 
controls account for virtually all of the emission reductions that are achieved in the SIP Seasonal 
scenario, while emission reductions due to fuel switching or reduction in output are very small. 
A second way to reduce emissions is a reduction in output in response to an increase in 
price. In the baseline in the SIP Call region, electricity price is $64.4 per MWh ($0.0644 per 
KWh) in 2008. Baseline generation is 2.139 billion MWh. Table 6 reports that under the SIP 
Seasonal policy, the price within the region would increase by $0.7 per MWh, or 1%. Generation 
in the region would fall by 20 million MWh (just over 0.5%). At the national level, as reported in 
Table 7, the price of electricity falls from the baseline to the SIP Seasonal policy by $0.3 per 
MWh, or 0.5%, and generation is virtually unchanged.  
The third way that emissions are reduced is input substitution, which includes switching 
from coal to gas generation and to some degree switching among coal units with different 
emission rates. In the SIP region we see a reduction in the use of coal and, to a smaller degree, 
increase in the use of gas. At the national level, the reduction in coal generation within the SIP 
region is partially offset by an increase in coal-fired generation outside the region, as well as an 
increase in gas-fired generation nationally.  
The SIP Seasonal policy leads to a small change in generation capacity at the national 
level. Table 8 indicates that there is a small decline in nationwide coal-fired capacity, 
commensurate with the small decline in coal-fired generation. There is an increase of almost 
3.7% in gas-fired capacity. Wind capacity declines because of the increase in relatively efficient 
new gas-fired capacity, which has lower variable costs than existing technologies. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
13 
The extension of the policy from a five-month summer season to year-round in the SIP 
Annual scenario would have a small effect on the price of electricity. Within the SIP region, 
electricity prices would rise by only $0.5 per MWh, or in fact a drop of $0.2 per MWh from the  
price that would accompany the SIP Seasonal policy. The price decrease is counter-intuitive even 
though compliance costs would total $2.73 billion, or nearly 20% more than in the SIP Seasonal 
scenario. At the national level, electricity prices are forecast to increase when moving from the 
SIP Seasonal to SIP Annual policy.  
It may be a surprise that expanded environmental policy may not necessarily lead to an 
increase in electricity prices. From the data one can see that expanded environmental policy will 
not necessarily lead to an increase in electricity prices. It is instructive to examine how extending 
a regional NOX policy from a seasonal to an annual basis could have a negligible or possibly 
negative effect on electricity prices. One reason is that the emission allowance price is 
dramatically less under an annual policy because the cost of NOX control including capital cost 
can be divided over a greater quantity of emission reductions to achieve a lower cost per ton 
reduced. The cost per ton reduced at the margin is determining allowance price, which directly 
enters the calculation of the variable cost of electricity generation. 
The second reason that the effect on price may be negligible has to do with changes in 
generation capacity, and with how the cost of capacity is reflected in electricity price. Slightly 
more than half the generation in the SIP Call region is in areas characterized by average cost 
pricing in the baseline, under which capital and variable costs are annualized and spread over 
total sales to calculate the price of electricity. In these areas, introducing a new environmental 
policy that increases the costs of electricity supply leads directly to an increase in the electricity 
price.  
The other part of generation in the SIP Call region is in the marginal cost areas where the 
electricity price is determined by the variable cost of the marginal generator plus the capacity 
cost of the marginal reserve unit. Policies that change the relative costs of facilities affect which 
facility is at the margin and thereby they affect prices,  the revenues earned by each facility, and 
thereby the policies affect capacity investment and retirement. In these areas, introducing a new 
environmental policy that increases the costs of electricity supply may lead to an increase or a 
decrease in the electricity price. 
Figure 1 illustrates a case in which the extension from the SIP Seasonal to SIP Annual 
policy reduces the electricity price. The figure depicts the determination of marginal generation 
cost in a baseload time block, which includes 70% of the hours in the season, in the summer Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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season in 2008 in New England (NE), a marginal cost region. The solid upward-sloping line is 
the schedule of variable generation costs in the SIP Seasonal scenario, and the dashed upward-
sloping line is the schedule in the SIP Annual scenario. The variable cost of a representative 
unscrubbed coal plant using a particular type of coal is represented by the point indicated on each 
supply curve.  
The latter half of the curve for the SIP Annual scenario lies generally below and to the 
right of the curve for the SIP Seasonal scenario. The shift downward reflects the fact that  the 
variable generation cost associated with the annual pollution program is less because the cost of 
a permit is less under the annual program. The cost of the permit (equivalent to the marginal cost 
of abatement) falls from $3,401 per ton in 2008 in the SIP Seasonal scenario to $1,985 in the SIP 
Annual scenario. The small vertical difference between the points representing the unscrubbed 
coal plant results because of the small reduction in variable cost for that plant. However, one can 
observe other parallel portions of the two curves that indicate a greater effect for some plants.  
The shift of the marginal cost curve to the right in the SIP Annual scenario, indicated, for 
example, by the shift in the point representing the unscrubbed coal plant, results from a change in 
the variable cost ordering among plants and a change in capacity. The unscrubbed coal plant 
indicated by the points has been pushed back in the variable cost ordering for electricity 
generation. The shift is due to the addition of new combined-cycle capacity, which has lower 
variable costs and appears earlier in the variable cost ordering for electricity generation. The 
vertical lines in Figure 1 represent the generation of electricity during the time block. Generation 
increases as marginal generation cost falls in moving from the SIP Seasonal to the SIP Annual 
scenario. When taking into account the effect in all time blocks, the net effect on electricity price 
is less than would be anticipated if all costs were passed through to ratepayers, as occurs in 
average cost regions.  
In the third scenario, the National Annual policy, the amount of capacity with post-
combustion control increases by nearly 60% beyond the policies aimed at the SIP region only. 
The vast majority of these controls are SCR. The total annual cost in 2008 for post-combustion 
controls is $4.43 billion, more than double the expense of controls under the SIP Seasonal policy 
and 63% greater than the cost of the SIP Annual policy. 
The National Annual policy would increase the price by $0.2 per MWh over the SIP 
Seasonal policy in the SIP Call region and increase the price over the baseline by $0.3 per MWh 
at the national level. At the national level total generation decreases from the baseline and SIP 
Seasonal scenarios by about 2%. Furthermore, the National Annual policy would decrease Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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generation from both coal (by 12 million MWh) and gas (by 47 million MWh), compared with 
the baseline.  
We report one sensitivity analysis of special interest. A possible evolution for policy 
regarding NOX emissions could be the extension of a SIP Seasonal scenario to a SIP Annual 
scenario at a later point in time. Some observers have expressed concern that the commitment to 
a seasonal program could lead to investment in compliance strategies that would be rendered 
inefficient if the program were eventually replaced by an annual program. To investigate the cost 
of a sequence of policy decisions we constructed a “SIP Sequence” scenario. The analysis 
combines a SIP Seasonal policy effective in 2004 with a surprise announcement in 2005 of a SIP 
Annual program that takes effect in 2008.  
Instead of the compliance cost increasing under the SIP Sequence scenario as compared 
with the SIP Annual policy, we find that the compliance cost decreases. This counter-intuitive 
result is explained by an increase in imports to the SIP region under the SIP Sequence scenario. 
The annualized expenditure on post-combustion control in 2008 under the SIP Sequence policy 
is $282 million (13%) more than under the SIP Seasonal policy, but it is $300 million (11%) less 
than under the SIP Annual policy. Electricity price in the SIP region in the SIP Sequence 
scenario increases by about $1.3 per MWh, or nearly two and a half times that of the increase 
when the SIP Annual policy is implemented directly. At the national level, electricity price under 
the SIP Sequence policy increases from the Baseline, though it decreases under the SIP Annual 
policy. The marginal cost per ton abated by post-combustion control is about $1,244 (37%) less 
than in the SIP Annual scenario. The average cost per ton is about $1,021 (10%) lower than in 
the SIP Annual scenario.  
Instead of installing additional combustion controls in the SIP region to attain the more 
stringent annual emissions cap in the SIP Sequence scenario, the SIP region increases imports of 
electricity from outside the region. Under the SIP Sequence scenario, the increase in generation 
outside the SIP region leads to an increase of 69 thousand tons in NOX emissions from the rest of 
the nation, more than twice the increase of 30 thousand tons in the SIP Annual scenario.  
In sum, the indirect path to annual NOX controls in the SIP region that is represented by 
the SIP Sequence policy leads to an increase in electricity imports to the region, a small increase 
in emissions outside the region, and an increase in electricity price. From an efficiency 
perspective, the most important cost would result from the four year delay in realizing the 
economic benefits of annual NOX reductions that total roughly $1 billion dollars per year in the Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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SIP region (the difference in health benefits between the SIP Seasonal and the SIP Annual 
scenarios). 
5.3 Cost Effectiveness of the Policies 
Table 9 reports the benefits and costs of emission reduction achieved from a nationwide 
and annual perspective for each policy. The first column repeats for convenience from Table 3 
the particulate related health benefits that are achieved, and the second column repeats from 
Table 5 the cost of post-combustion controls.  
A main result of this analysis is displayed in the third column of Table 9, which reports 
the value of net benefits (benefits minus costs). The values in this column are less than zero for 
all policies, suggesting that particulate related health benefits are not sufficient by themselves to 
justify the costs of the program, but they offset the costs importantly. The main result is that the 
net benefits are greatest under the SIP Annual policy, making it the most cost effective policy 
option. The net benefits of the SIP Annual policy are about $400 million per year greater than 
under the SIP Seasonal policy. 
Table 9 reports “partial” net benefits because only the benefits of particulate reductions 
are considered and other benefits of NOX reductions are omitted. In the next section, we argue 
that the inclusion of additional benefits would strengthen the relative cost effectiveness of the 
SIP Annual policy compared to the SIP Seasonal policy. In addition, only compliance costs of 
post-combustion controls are accounted for and other aspects of social cost are not included. A 
more complete measure of economic cost would account for changes in utilization of facilities 
and associated changes in fuel expenditures, as well as changes in investments in generation 
capacity. Corresponding to that would be a measure of how the change in electricity 
consumption affects consumer welfare. To measure these offsetting effects on producers and 
consumers requires a welfare analysis that captures changes in producer and consumer surplus in 
the electricity market (Palmer, et al. 2001). Even more comprehensive would be a measure that 
accounts for interactions among all sectors of the economy and accounted for pre-existing 
policies including taxes. A recent and growing literature has shown that these interactions may 
have a substantial effect on the general measure of costs (Goulder et al.,1999), and they may 
have an effect on the measure of benefits (Williams, 2000). In this study we report only the most 
common measures of costs and benefits, and in the next section we compare these estimates with 
those obtained in previous studies. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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6. Comparison with Previous Studies 
To compare our analysis with previous studies raises a potential point of confusion in the 
differing quantity of tons of NOX reduced in each study. We therefore characterize benefits and 
costs per ton of NOX emissions reduced on a nationwide annual basis for all policies. The right-
hand side columns of Table 9 express particulate related health benefits and compliance costs per 
ton of emission reductions achieved nationwide and annually in 2008. The average benefit 
estimate accounts for emission changes outside the SIP region, a consideration that is missing in 
most of the previous studies. The data indicates that the economic value of emission reductions 
are greatest inside the SIP region, which is due to the higher concentration of population 
compared to the rest of the nation, as well as to atmospheric chemistry and meteorology. The 
particulate related health benefits from mortality and morbidity improvements average to $755 
per ton in the SIP Seasonal scenario, $747 per ton in the SIP Annual scenario and $647 per ton in 
the National Annual scenario. 
Average cost is calculated as the cost of post-combustion control divided by the emission 
reductions achieved on a national and annual basis. In the SIP Seasonal case we find average 
costs of $2,163 per ton. The average cost in the SIP Annual case falls to $1,147 per ton, and 
$1,119 per ton in the National Annual scenario. 
The final column reports marginal cost, which is equivalent to the predicted price for an 
emission allowance. In the baseline, a marginal cost of $1,356 per ton is reported, which is the 
marginal cost of reductions in the northeastern OTR states. In the SIP Seasonal scenario the 
marginal cost is $3,401 per ton. In the SIP Annual scenario, the marginal cost falls to $1,985 and 
in the National Annual scenario the marginal costs is $3,884. 
For convenience the estimates of average benefits and costs per ton appear in Table 10 
for comparison with other studies. Burtraw et al. (1998) examine the reductions in NOX and SO2 
emissions resulting from the 1990 amendments to the Clear Air Act using the TAF model for 
atmospheric transport and health effects, and using similar assumptions for the benefit 
calculations, but using a different model of costs and emissions for electricity generation. They 
find median benefits due to reduction in premature mortality stemming from reduction in nitrate 
concentrations to be $570 per ton of reduction in NOX emissions. The median benefits stemming 
from reduction in morbidity are $169 per ton of reduction in NOX emissions. The sum of effects 
is $739 per ton, accruing from reductions around the nation.  
Banzhaf et al. (1996) report on two studies of externalities from power plants in 
Wisconsin and Minnesota, but they look only at benefits within parts of those states and exclude Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
18 
benefits from long-range transport. They find benefits from mortality and morbidity 
improvements stemming from reductions in nitrates ranging from about $35 per ton of NOX 
reductions for a plant in a rural setting, to $366 for a plant in an urban setting. These numbers 
would be greater for a larger region or a more densely populated area. They also calculate 
potential damages for ozone and attribute all the damage to NOX as a precursor to ozone. They 
find ozone damages range from $29 (with an uncertainty range including zero) for a plant in a 
rural setting, to $358 for a plant in an urban setting.  
The estimates in Banzhaf et al. include both agricultural effects and human health effects. 
They find potential health benefits from emissions reductions of NOX and SO2 account for 56% 
to 80% of all damages. Agricultural effects are second, with damages of 15% to 25% of all 
damages. Materials and visibility effects are third, accounting for about 11% of all damages. The 
attribution of damages to category depends on the location of the plant. In a broad survey of 
three comprehensive studies done in the United States and Europe that examined externalities 
from electricity generation, Krupnick and Burtraw (1996) find that 82% to 93% of all 
quantifiable damages stem from the air-health environmental pathway when ozone effects are 
taken into account. The major component of quantifiable damage is attributable to the change in 
particulate concentrations. Together, these studies justify a focus on particulate-related benefits 
as a bellwether of the cost-effectiveness of a reduction program. 
Rowe et al. (1996) report on a series of case studies using a model specialized to 
locations in New York State. They find that benefits per ton of reduction in NOX emissions tend 
to range from about $1,071 per ton for a natural gas combined-cycle plant to $1,140 per ton for a 
pulverized coal steam plant in areas away from major population centers. The estimates vary 
with type of technology because Rowe et al. account for variation in stack height and velocity in 
modeling atmospheric transport of emissions. The estimates combine the effects of NOX in 
secondary ozone formation and secondary particulate formation.  
Krupnick, McConnell et al. (2000) examine the costs and benefits of NOX emissions 
reductions in a trading program in the summer ozone season. Their model is aimed at NOX 
emissions reductions in 12 states and the District of Columbia, which represent the major sources 
of emissions in the eastern United States. Emissions reductions are achieved over 12 months. 
Their model also differs from ours in not allowing for changes in utilization of facilities as a way 
to meet emissions goals. They find that the cost per ton of NOX reductions in a broad trading 
program across much of the SIP Call region is $1,032 per ton reduced. Their estimated marginal 
cost is $4,646. This study also calculates the expected benefits of ozone reductions. In the middle 
case, benefits from ozone reductions average $167 per ton reduced. However, the benefits are an Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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order of magnitude higher under alternative assumptions about the potency of ozone on human 
health. 
The document that serves as the primary analysis of the expected cost of NOX reductions 
associated with EPA’s proposed trading program is U.S. EPA (1998b). This study models a 
scenario similar to the one we model for the SIP Seasonal case. Consequently, we spend some 
time comparing this study with our own. 
In the EPA study (1998b), the average cost per ton of NOX emissions reduction achieved 
in the summer ozone season was $1,807. Our estimate was $2,019 per ton. Differences in the 
characterization of the baseline explain much of this small difference. The EPA baseline includes 
only Phase I controls in the OTC that mandate reasonable available control technology, but our 
baseline includes Phase II (trading) with lower average emission rates. Hence, there exist 
relatively low-cost options in the EPA model that we have already been included in our baseline. 
Also, our baseline assumes 8.7% greater generation in 2008 than does the EPA baseline (for 
2007), resulting from our estimate of greater growth in electricity consumption. Our assumption 
appears closer to recent updates to the Annual Energy Outlook (U.S. EIA 1999). In addition, the 
emissions cap is 544,000 tons in the EPA study but the cap is 444,300 in our study; which also 
contributes to our higher cost estimate. Total reductions are 958,000 tons in the EPA study and 
1,090,000 in our study. The EPA study includes the original 22 eastern states plus the District of 
Columbia; our SIP region varies slightly. 
The change in prices in the EPA study (1998b) is about 1.6% assuming marginal cost 
pricing throughout the electricity sector, and about 1.2% assuming average cost pricing. The 
EPA study does not clarify whether this applies to the SIP region or the nation. Our rise in prices 
in the SIP region, which combines average and marginal cost pricing, is about 1.1% in the SIP 
Seasonal scenario. 
The document that serves as the primary analysis of the expected benefits of NOX 
reductions associated with EPA’s proposed trading program for is U.S. EPA (1998d). This study 
models the benefits of the scenario described in U.S. EPA (1998b). Alternative low and high 
assumptions provide a large range of possible benefits. In the low case, ozone health benefits 
total $34 per ton of NOX reduced. Particulate-related benefits total $714 per ton, similar to the 
numbers in our SIP Seasonal scenario. These are almost all health related, with a small fraction 
stemming from household soiling and visibility effects. In addition, the EPA study finds ozone-
related benefits in commercial agriculture and forestry of $325 per ton, and benefits from 
reduced nitrogen deposition of $297 per ton. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
20 
Using the high set of assumptions, the EPA study finds ozone health benefits of $1,689 
per ton of NOX reduction. This large increase is entirely attributable to the assumption of a link 
between ozone and premature mortality. Particulate-related benefits rise to $2,504. This is also 
almost entirely attributable to the assumption of a link between nitrates and premature mortality. 
The estimates for the effects of ozone on agriculture and forestry increase to $717 per ton, and 
the estimates for nitrogen deposition remain at $297 per ton. 
The assumptions we employ in our scenarios conform well to the low case in the EPA 
study and to others found in the literature. The major source of expected benefits from NOX 
reductions is expected to be reduced concentrations of nitrates. These benefits are not seasonally 
dependent if NOX emission reductions are achieved year-round. In addition, the nitrogen 
deposition benefits in the EPA model could accrue year-round with reductions in NOX 
emissions. A smaller portion of potential benefits is associated with reductions in ozone 
concentrations, which are limited to the five-month summer ozone season. Hence, the modeling 
of particulates as a proxy for the benefits of NOX reductions provides a useful measure of the 
benefits that could be anticipated in a seasonal or annual program. 
Implementing a regional or national NOX reduction policy may prove difficult. All three 
scenarios we examine assume that the prescribed NOX emissions cap takes effect in 2004. To 
meet this deadline, a number of electricity generators may need to extend their regular scheduled 
maintenance outages to allow time to install emissions control equipment. Some industry 
participants have expressed concern that these extended outages could adversely affect reliability 
(UARG 1998). Formal analysis of this question by NERC suggests that equipment retrofits could 
have an effect on reliability in the NERC subregions that include much of the Midwest, but that 
this effect could be largely mitigated through coordinated planning of outages and by 
encouraging early retrofits at some plants (NERC 2000). In addition, EPA has set up a 
compliance supplement pool to extend the dates of compliance for certain generation units 
(Napolitano 1999). We have not modeled explicitly in our scenarios the effect of pollution 
control equipment retrofits on the planned outage rates at existing plants. However, by focusing 
on results for 2008, we are considering a timeframe after which any potential disruptions in 
generation reliability should be overcome. We do not consider the additional cost that may 
accompany power supply disruptions during the construction and implementation period. Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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7. Conclusion 
The existing literature consistently finds that potential improvement in human health 
from reductions in particulate (nitrate) concentrations is the most important category of potential 
benefits from reductions in NOX emissions. This paper measures only these health benefits, to 
the exclusion of other potential health benefits from reduced ozone concentrations and to the 
exclusion of benefits from other economic endpoints. Hence, this paper is not intended as a full 
benefit-cost analysis of policy alternatives. Rather, the focus is to use particulate-related health 
improvements as a proxy for the full slate of potential benefits to learn about the relative cost-
effectiveness of the policies from an approximate and partial benefit-cost exercise. 
The main result that emerges is that net benefits are $400 million greater under a SIP 
Annual policy than under a SIP Seasonal policy. On the basis of particulate related health 
improvements only, and considering only compliance costs within the electricity sector as a 
proxy for social costs, the net benefits are about -$1.4 billion in the SIP Seasonal scenario, -$0.95 
billion in the SIP Annual scenario, and -$1.87 billion in the National Annual scenario.  
In all three scenarios, our partial measures of net benefits are negative. Hence, 
particulate-related benefits alone is not sufficient for any of the three scenarios to pass a benefit-
cost test. How would the inclusion of other benefit categories affect the policy ranking from a 
cost-effectiveness perspective? 
Other studies suggest that other compelling benefits exist, and they serve to strengthen 
our conclusion. EPA’s benefit analysis of the NOX SIP Call (EPA 1998d) suggests an additional 
source of benefits from reduced nitrogen deposition. These benefits would accrue all year so 
benefits in the annual scenarios would increase more than in the seasonal scenario, strengthening 
the justification for an annual approach. The other major additional sources of benefits addressed 
by EPA are ozone related (health and agriculture), and these benefits would accrue primarily 
during the summer ozone season. Since the emissions reductions in the ozone season in the SIP 
region are virtually identical under the seasonal and annual policies, the potential ozone-related 
benefits would increase total benefits by an equal amount for both the SIP Seasonal and the SIP 
Annual scenarios. This would change the relevant net benefit estimates in an identical way, by 
adding the same value to the net benefit of each scenario. So in sum, consideration of omitted 
benefits reinforces the finding that the SIP Annual scenario is more cost-effective than the SIP 
Seasonal scenario.  
In conclusion, the cost of a policy to reduce NOX emissions year-round in the eastern 
states is 27 percent greater than the cost of a policy that targets just the five-month summer Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
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ozone season. In comparison, the benefit from a year-round reduction in atmospheric 
concentration of particulates is more than twice the benefit from a program that targets just the 
ozone season. If a seasonal program is going to be implemented based on ozone related benefits 
(that we do not model) as is intended by current policy, then the additional benefits of extending 
the program to an annual basis far outweigh the additional costs. 
Particulate reductions and related health benefits are the most certain and are expected to 
be the most significant benefits from reductions in NOX emissions. However, there are many 
uncertainties associated with this analysis. Consideration of omitted benefits including those 
stemming from reduction in ozone concentrations suggests that the main finding holds a fortiori. 
That finding leads us to conclude that the EPA and the affected states should consider replacing 
or supplementing the current initiative for the eastern United States—a seasonal program to 
reduce NOX emissions—with a new initiative aimed at annual reductions. 
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Table 1. NERC subregions, the year marginal cost pricing begins, and subregions 












ECAR  MI, IN, OH, WV; part of KY, 
VA, PA 
-   ECAR 
ERCOT  Most of TX  2002     
MAAC  MD, DC, DE, NJ; most of PA  2000  MAAC  MAAC 
MAIN  Most of IL, WI; part of MO  -    MAIN 
MAPP  MN, IA, NE, SD, ND; part of 
WI, IL 
-    
NE  VT, NH, ME, MA, CT, RI  2000  NE  NE 
NY NY  1999  NY NY 
FRCC  Most of FL  -     
STV  TN, AL, GA, SC, NC; part of 
VA, MS, KY, FL 
-   STV 
SPP  KS, MO, OK, AR, LA; part of 
MS, TX 
-    
NWP  WA, OR, ID, UT, MT, part of 
WY, NV 
-    
RA  AZ, NM, CO, part of WY  -     
CNV  CA, part of NV  1998     Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
26 
Table 2. NOX Emissions in the SIP Call region and nation in the baseline, and 
change from baseline under alternative scenarios for 2008. 
  Annual Summer 







Baseline  3,449 5,533  1,445  2,377 
SIP Seasonal  -1,031 -992 -1,024  -1,001 
SIP Annual   -2,408  -2,378 -1,004  -995 
National Annual  -2,528  -3,962  -1,050 -1,698 
 
 
Table 3. Nationwide annual mprovements in public health for 2008. 
 
  Health Benefits from NOX reductions 
compared to Baseline 
 (million 1997$) 
  Morbidity   Mortality  Total 
SIP Seasonal  160 589  749 
SIP Annual   383 1,393  1,777 
National Annual  559 2,005  2,564 
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Table 4. National retrofit post-combustion capacity in baseline, and change from 
baseline under alternative scenarios for 2008. 
 
  National Retrofit Post-Combustion 
Control Capacity 
 (thousand MW) 
  SCR   SNCR Total 
Baseline  0 11.4  11.44 
SIP Seasonal  +144.2 +57.4 +201.6 
SIP Annual   +169.6 +30.3 +199.9 
National Annual  +307.8 +14.3 +322.1 
 
 
Table 5. Nationwide annual cost of post-combustion control in baseline, and 
change from baseline under alternative scenarios in 2008. 
 
  SCR (million $)  SNCR (million $)  ALL 
(million $) 
  O&M Capital  O&M Capital  Total 
Baseline  0  0  16 14 30 
SIP Seasonal  +953  +1,070  +42 +81 +2,146 
SIP Annual  +1,299 +1,274  +109  +46  +2,728 
National Annual  +2,198  +2,188  +29 +19 +4,434 
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Table 6. Generation by fuel and electricity price in the SIP Call region in baseline, 
and change from baseline under alternative scenarios, for 2008. 
  Regional Generation 
 (million MWh) 
Regional Price 
(1997$/MWh) 
  Coal   Gas  Total   
Baseline  1,095 460  2,139 64.4 
SIP Seasonal  -19 +4  -20 +0.7 
SIP Annual   +11 -19  -7  +0.5 
National Annual  +2 -5  -11  +0.9 
 
 
Table 7. National generation by fuel and electricity price in baseline, and change 
from baseline under alternative scenarios, for 2008. 
  National Generation 
 (million MWh) 
National Price 
(1997$/MWh) 
  Coal   Gas  Total   
Baseline  1,767 1,182 3,996 62.2 
SIP Seasonal  -8 +39  +1  -0.3 
SIP Annual  +17 +21 +14 -0.1 
National Annual  -12 -47 -79 +0.3 
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Table 8. National generation capacity by fuel in baseline, and change from 
baseline under alternative scenarios for 2008. 
 
  National Generation Capacity 
(thousand MW) 
  Coal   Gas  Total 
Baseline  323 284 876 
SIP Seasonal  -0.1 +10.5 +0.3 
SIP Annual   -1.3 +7.1 -0.8 
National Annual  -1.1 +0.4 +1.3 
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Table 9. Nationwide, annual particulate related health benefits and costs for 2008. 
  Benefits/Costs in Aggregate    Benefits/Costs per Ton 
  (million 1997$)  (thousand 
short tons) 
(1997$ per short ton) 










(from Table 5) 
(Partial) 














Baseline  -  30  -  5,533 -  -  1,356 
SIP Seasonal  +749 +2,146  -1,397  -992 755  2,163  3,401 
SIP Annual   +1,777 +2,728 -951  -2,378 747  1,147  1,985 
National Annual  +2,564 +4,434 -1,870  -3,962 647  1,119  3,884 
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Table 10. Benefits and costs of NOX reductions in the literature. 
(1997 dollars)  
per ton NOX  
Benefits Costs  Comments 
 PM  Ozone   
Scenarios:      
SIP Seasonal  755   2,163  Sources in SIP Region and 
benefits throughout US; 
summer ozone season  
SIP Annual  747   1,147  Sources in SIP Region and 
benefits throughout US 
National Annual  647   1,119  Sources and benefits 
throughout US 
Previous Studies:      
Burtraw et al. 
(1998) 
739     Sources and benefits 
throughout US 
Banzhaf et al. 
(1996) 
35-366 29-358   Benefits in parts of Minnesota, 
Wisconsin only 
Rowe et al. (1996)  1071-1140   Sources in NY State; benefits 
throughout US and combine 
PM and ozone 
Krupnick, 
McConnell et al. 
(2000) 
 167  1,032  Sources and benefits in subset 
of SIP Region; average cost 
includes reductions over 
twelve months 
USEPA (1998b)     1,807  Sources in SIP region; 
lower Baseline emissions 
USEPA (1998d)  714-2504 34-1689    Health  
  297 325-717    Only nitrogen deposition for 
PM, only agriculture and 
forestry for ozone 
  1011-2801 359-2406    Sum of health and other 
benefits Resources for the Future  Burtraw et al. 
32 
 
Figure 1. The schedule of variable generation cost for the New England NERC 
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